

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIV. No. 11.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

"Curls are not cannons; hair-powder is not gun-powder, tails are not bayonets. Are these the arms and ammunition, by which the enemies of Russia are to be defeated!"—SEWAROFF.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGAL.—Of the victories, obtained over the French, in Portugal, by the English army, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and which victories are detailed in the official papers contained in this sheet, it is unnecessary to attempt to speak in praise; but, as far as we can judge from the accounts yet received, they certainly reflect the greatest honour on the army as well as on the commanders of every rank. It was, in my opinion, fully proved before, that our troops, when well commanded, were far superior to the French troops. I never regarded the assertion of that superiority as an empty boast. There were always reasons why our troops should be intrinsically better, and there was abundant experience to verify the theory. But, now, I should imagine, it will be very difficult for the French, though masters of the press of Europe, to prevent that fact from being acknowledged all over the world. In this point of view alone, then, our success is of vast importance. The victory, though not more glorious to the nation, is, in this as well as in other parts of its consequences, near and remote, of far greater importance to us than the victory of Trafalgar, which gave no new turn to the war, excited no great degree of feeling in the nations of Europe, and did not, in the least, arrest the progress of the French arms or diminish their fame or that dread of those arms which universally prevailed.—The consequences of this victory will be, first, a thorough conviction in the mind of every man in this kingdom, that the French, when met by us upon any thing like equal terms, are pretty sure to be beaten, which conviction will produce a confidence in our means of defence which did not unequivocally exist before, it will dissipate all the unmanly apprehensions about the threatened invasion, and, of course, it will, in a short time, relieve the country, in great part at least, from the inconvenience and distress, which, in so many ways, arise from the present harrassing system of internal defence. Secondly, this victory, gained under such circumstances, will take off from that dread, in which the French arms have

been so long held in other nations, and particularly in the southern parts of Europe. Thirdly, it will confirm the confidence of the Spaniards, will make them even bolder than they were, will make them despise as well as hate the French. Fourthly, it will not only diminish the military and pecuniary means of Napoleon, but will render him timid; it will make him hesitate; it will fill him with apprehensions; it will enervate his councils; the consequence of which may be his total overthrow; particularly as his rigorous maritime and commercial regulations are so severely felt in all the countries under his control. Amongst the minor consequences of this victory (taking for granted that it will lead to the total evacuation of Portugal by the French) will be a speedy and bloodless settlement of our dispute with America, which is costing us something in precautionary measures. The American trade to Spain and Portugal was very great; and to trade thither *now*, as well as with the colonies of those countries, we can, if they behave well, give them leave.—The merit of the ministers in sending out this expedition, in their plan of operations, in their choice of a commander, and in every part of the enterprize, no man of a just mind will, whatever be his sentiments in other respects, attempt to deny. They would, if the thing had failed, have been loaded with no small share of the blame; it would, therefore, be the height of injustice to withhold from them their share of the praise. Indeed, it cannot be denied, that almost the whole of their measures, with respect to foreign countries, have been strongly marked with foresight, promptitude, and vigour. Their Orders in Council, against which Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Roscoe, and the Barings, so bitterly inveighed, have been one cause, and not a trifling one, of the events in Spain and Portugal, into which countries we could not have entered had not *the people* been with us, and that the people were with us, arose, in great part, from those despair-creating effects, which were produced by the Orders in Council, which orders they could not fail to ascribe to Napoleon, nor could they fail to perceive, that,

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while he possessed their country, there was not the smallest chance of their being relieved from those effects. How false, then, have events proved to be the reasoning of Lord Grenville and Mr. Roscoe and Mr. Baring, that the Orders in Council would make us detested by all the suffering nations, and would tend to strengthen the power of Napoleon over them! I could easily refer to the passage, wherein I contended, that the Orders in Council would naturally have the effect of shaking the authority of Napoleon in the conquered, or dependant, states, by producing unbearable distress. I, indeed, wished for a still greater stretch of maritime power. I wished an interdict to be issued against all those not in alliance with us. I wished the whole world to be told: "As long as you suffer France to command all the land, England will command all the sea, and from that sea, she will permit none of you to derive any, even the smallest advantage, or comfort." But, without this, the ministers really have done what they said they would do; they have brought things to a crisis; they have got rid of that benumbing, death-like lingering, which had been the characteristic of our warfare for so many years; and, if they follow up their blows, it is not impossible, that, after all the senseless admiration which has been bestowed upon speech-making ministers, we may see the conqueror of Europe, the king and queen maker, toppled from his stool by the Duke of Portland.—Now is the time to recall the public attention to the doctrines of Mr. Whitbread and Mr. Roscoe. I should now like to see, from the pen of the latter in particular, an essay on *the wisdom of making peace in 1806*, and another upon *the moderation of Napoleon*, both of which were the subjects of his dull pamphlet. I should like now to see him attempting to convince the manufacturers, that they would have gained by a peace made in 1806, and that they would have enjoyed their gains in peace and safety. His doctrines, luckily for the nation, did not prevail. The common sense of the people taught them that his doctrines were false. He could not make them see any prospect of real peace; and, though the conqueror was still borne upon the wings of victory; though a refusal to submit to his terms was followed by a still greater extension of his power and of our danger, yet the nation said, "go on he must if he will, for, until the state of Europe be changed, England cannot enjoy a moment's real peace." By the measures of the present ministers, the great question, which every one was afraid to moot, was at once clearly

put: can England exist independent, and in defiance, of all the civilized world, or can she not? This question, the most interesting that ever was started, has now been decided, and for this decision, so glorious to us and to our country for ever, we have to thank the men who are at present in power.—But, if these victories, and if a continuation of success, is not to have the effect of diminishing the sacrifices that the people make; if they are not to put an end in time, to the system of red-coat arming and forts and barracks, in England, I shall regard them as being of little use. I do not expect or wish, that these precautions, little as I may think of their efficacy, should *all at once* be thrown aside; but, I do hope, that, as soon as all reasonable men are perfectly satisfied, that there is no longer the smallest danger of invasion, the ministers will begin to shew a disposition to restore the country to its former state of confidence in itself, to abridge the enormous expences of an establishment which now costs about twenty millions annually, and to render the ruling influence less of a military nature. The army, or at least, the part of the nation under military rule and influence, is too large to be consistent with the principles or the practice of freedom. Regarded as the means of an emergency it is not so odious; but, if it were to be attempted to keep such a force on foot as a permanent establishment, we might, at once, bid adieu to the hope of ever being a free people, and, in fact, we should have made all these sacrifices, and our countrymen would have bled, only for the purpose of forging and rivetting our own chains. By degrees, which succeed each other very rapidly, a military nation gets into a military government. It is quite impossible to separate the things in idea, and as impossible to separate them long in fact. They are interwoven in their nature.—The expence too is enormous. Every parent who leaves a hundred pounds in legacies to his children, has to reflect, that six or seven of those pounds are now deducted for purposes of a military nature. To maintain such an army, with all its numerous retainers, and all its pretences for expenditure, must alone, in time, leave the individual proprietor little to call his own. In short, it must eat him out of house and home.—Therefore, in rejoicing at the success of the army, in applauding the wisdom and bravery of all concerned in the enterprize, I must say, that no small part of my satisfaction arises from the hope, that, in the end, this success, with the others, by which I trust it will be followed, will produce a diminution

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of the army and its expences.—That we should continue a military nation, as long as the necessity exists, there can be no doubt; and, that we should afterwards have a general and permanent plan of military defence is what I wish for; but, that we should have a large permanent army, commanded by officers appointed and cashiered at pleasure; that we should have such an army an hour longer than is absolutely necessary to our security from the attacks of a *foreign foe*, I hope no man will be found to assert; especially after the glorious example given us by the patriots of Spain, who have proved to the whole world, that a people rising in defence of their country, though without discipline and without appointed leaders, are more than a match for the bravest and most skillful enemy.

SPAIN.—In speaking of the probability of Buonaparte being overthrown, and in expressing satisfaction at that probability, I must always be understood as including the condition, that his sway is succeeded by a free government; because, if people are to be slaves, it is a circumstance of no consequence at all whom they are slaves to, except that it is less dishonourable to bend the knee to a famous conqueror than to a silly creature, who has never done any thing but eat and drink. If the nations, who, to all appearance, are breaking his chains, have the wisdom and the virtue to drive out despotism of every sort along with him, then they will and ought to succeed; but, if the wars against him be carried on by a cabal, by a faction whose object is to exalt themselves, they not only will fail but they ought to fail. The work of opposing him is but just begun. What is done is nothing, if not well followed up. To be sure, a defeat of him who has so long been accustomed to meet with uninterrupted success is an excellent beginning. He has, however, been defeated before now; and his army, under other commanders, has been defeated: yet, he recovered that; it produced little injury to him in any way. What line of conduct he may adopt with regard to Spain and Portugal, whether he may send large armies thither, or may leave them for a while to see the result of those internal differences which he may naturally expect to see arise, and which he will not fail to endeavour to foment, is quite uncertain. It will, however, be a great error in us to act as if we supposed, that he had given up the idea of placing kings of his own family upon the thrones of Spain and Portugal. He is not easily turned from any of his projects; and it would be a dreadful mistake to suppose,

that, because our newspapers laugh at him, he is really, all at once, in consequence of the loss of thirty or forty thousand men, become an object of contempt. The internal affairs of Spain cannot be easily arranged and settled. The patriots have pronounced their old government an *infamous* one; they have stipulated with the people for a *reform of abuses*; they have demanded an *assembling of the Cortes*. If there are no interested motives to come athwart the intended reformation, the little confusion that will arise will be of no consequence; but, if there are; if private interest and not public good be the object of the leaders, Joseph Napoleon will yet be king of Spain and the Indies, in spite of all that we can do to the contrary. I am, I must confess, sorry that Napoleon does not seem disposed to send armies into Spain. I wish the war there to be long and arduous; for, if it cease now, *the people* will have gained very little indeed, especially if any of the rags of the old government are brought back again. Nay, it is very probable, that they may be worse treated than they were before. The despots will conclude, and with reason, that the people are fashioned to despotism. They will have got a new lease of their enjoyments and their abuses; and the people will be more wretched than ever. All the old corrupt crew will be in power. There will be no example given to the enslaved nations of the world, except that of a people having shed their blood for the apparent purpose of perpetuating their own slavery; of calling back despotism amongst them, after they had got rid of it. A struggle of some length would have made the people of Spain think no more of FERDINAND than they would think of a fly. Such a struggle must have called up hidden talents and virtues. Now there appears to be a sickness in the councils of the Juntas; and of this, it is very probable, Buonaparte may take advantage. What we ought to wish for is a new and vigorous government in Spain; a government upon principles precisely the opposite of those whereon Napoleon's government is built and maintained; a government that would be a living example to all the nations whom he has enslaved. He has in his clutches the chief of that government which we seem to desire for Spain. Who is to make him give that chief up; and, if he does it, upon what *conditions* will he do it? It is easy to see what a turmoil must arise out of this single circumstance. While Ferdinand is in France, unless all idea of making him king be abandoned, there never can be any peaceable

settlement of affairs in Spain. If, in the midst of those divisions of opinion that will inevitably arise, as to what ought to be done, Napoleon send an army of a hundred thousand men, his brother will be seated upon the throne with very little difficulty. It appears to me, therefore, that the thing to be desired, is a *new government*, established as soon as possible, unless Buonaparte immediately send his armies; for, in that case, there will want very little of government until the war be over, and then it will be found, that the talents and virtues of the nation have, of their own accord, formed the sort of government required by the state of the country. There are some who talk of FERDINAND as if he had been fairly chosen by the people of Spain, who had first put down his father. The Morning Chronicle, of the 2d instant, has, upon the subject, a long-winded article, which concludes thus: "The Spaniards are fighting for their national independence, and for their legitimate sovereign—but what constitutes the *legitimacy* of FERDINAND VII.? That which made WILLIAM III. the legitimate sovereign of this country, *"the choice of the people."* They have set aside his father by *forcing* him to abdicate his throne, because he was incapable and unworthy to reign. Instead of embarrassing themselves, like the French, with speculative theories of government, they have chosen his son as his successor, as the English chose the son-in-law of JAMES II.; and we have not a doubt, that their privileges will be assured, as ours were, by a Bill of Rights. Their conduct ought to operate, both as a warning to kings, and an encouragement to every people; and if princes do not profit from the lesson, their subjects will, we trust, follow the example of the Spaniards."—Now, I should like to know what evidence there is of the people of Spain having given their voice for the young king. Never has there appeared the slightest foundation for the assertion. The people had nothing at all to do with the matter. The old king was turned out by a band of armed men; he was, indeed, forced to abdicate his throne; but it was by a cabal at court, and with which cabal the people of Spain had nothing to do. The son, having assumed the kingly office, afterwards abdicates it in behalf of Napoleon; so that, if he really was chosen by the people, he gave up what the people had given him, and Joseph went to Spain in virtue of the people's choice. With those who stick to Ferdinand there must always this embarrassment exist: they must either acknowledge in him a want

of legitimate right to reign, or they must openly avow the doctrine, that the people have, at all times, a right to cashier their kings. As to saying, that the Spaniards chose the son of the old "unworthy" king as the English chose the son-in-law of their unworthy king; the very existence of such persons was a matter of accident. Suppose these kings had had neither sons nor sons-in-law, were the people to have gone to the more distant relations? Suppose they had been able to find no distant relations; what was then to have been done? Does this right of cashiering kings, or, to use the more gentle phrase of the Morning Chronicle, this right of "*forcing* kings to abdicate," exist only in cases where the said kings happen to have relations? Will the people at Whitehall admit the right of cashiering kings? If they do not, where will they find a justification for any attempt that may be made by us to place Ferdinand upon the throne, during the life of that father, who protested against the violence which compelled him to abdicate? But, coupling the cause of Spain with that of this man; we get ourselves into difficulties, from which it will not be easy for us to get clear. Nor should I be at all surprized, if, bye-and-bye, we should see all our present hopes blasted in consequence of some act of pertinacity relating to the sort of government which we, or our rulers, desire to have established in Spain.

DUKE OF YORK.—I had, I thought, entirely done with this subject in my last sheet; and I now revive it merely to point out to the public a striking proof of the falsehood of the pamphlet there noticed. It charges the daily papers with malice against the Royal Chieftain. It represents them as encouraged by both the parties, the *ins* and the *outs*, to assault him; to misrepresent, ridicule, and degrade him. Now, let us see how this charge is justified by the conduct of the official paper of the Opposition. That paper, upon the first appearance of the pamphlet, said: "It has evidently been written under the eye, and published with the sanction, of the Duke of York. Nay, we conceive, that it must have had the concurrence of the highest authority in the kingdom." Here, then, it unequivocally imputes the pamphlet to the dictation, if not the pen, of the duke, and to the approbation of the king. On the 2d instant, this same paper says: "We have already noticed the public and authentic disavowal of the 'Statement' lately published, under the assumed character of a defender of his royal highness the Duke of York."

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opinions, to ascertain with precision the state of the moon.—But, Sir, this plea of subsequent information will not, I am sorry to say it, save your credit. For, in both these articles, you give an opinion, nay, you make assertions, not upon hearsay, not upon extraneous information, but (mark it well) upon the internal evidence of the work in question. In the first article you say that it is evident that the duke dictated the work, and that it must have had the king's concurrence. That is to say, the work was of that nature and was so written, that the duke and the king must necessarily be at the bottom of it. Now, then, how do you characterize this same work in your second article? Well may you turn your eyes away from the quotation that you perceive coming! How, I say, do you characterize the work which you had, but a few days before, ascribed to the Duke of York and the king? Why, by asserting that it contains “gross and absurd falsehoods in every page.” That is to say, taking both your articles together, the duke has evidently dictated and the king must have approved of, a work containing “gross and absurd falsehoods in every page.” Is this, Sir, a specimen of that respect, which you are pleased to profess towards the royal family?—To the assertion, that the falsehoods are gross and absurd you do, indeed, add, that “they cannot possibly proceed from any man having any knowledge of what really has passed respecting the Duke of York;” and, as the king and the duke must have known what did pass, you thus ward off the charge of imputing the gross and absurd falsehoods to them. But, there is still a difficulty, which you do not seem to have perceived when the loyal fit was upon you; and that is, that the falsehoods, if gross and absurd, must have so appeared to you when you imputed the work to the Duke and the King, or, that you are a person not capable of perceiving falsehoods, however gross and absurd, until they are pointed out to you. You now tell us, that the falsehoods, in every page, are so gross and absurd, that they could not possibly have proceeded from any man having any knowledge of what has really passed respecting the Duke of York. There is an impossibility in the thing. You want no reasoning or facts to convince you of it. You at once see that it must be so. Yet, only about ten days before, you told me and all the rest of your ardent admirers, that these things, which you now call “gross and absurd falsehoods” had evidently been written under the eye of the duke, had been published under his sanction, and

that the work *must* have had the concurrence of the king! Who is to believe what you say in future? What reliance is to be placed upon your sense or your sincerity?

—You tell us, in conclusion, that there is no foundation whatever for the assertion, that any such inquiry as that mentioned in the pamphlet, into the conduct of the duke has been, at any time, carried on, at the instigation of one party, or defeated by the protection of the other; and you add, that you are *sure*, that both parties will be equally ready to contradict the statement of the writer. It is possible that you may have received such assurances; it is possible that you may have been ordered to communicate such assurances to the world; but, how are we to believe you? How are we to know, that you will not, at some time hence, flatly contradict what you now say, and call it a gross and absurd falsehood? The truth is, that you, very unwisely, imputed the pamphlet to the duke and the king; you found yourself embarrassed by this hasty imputation; your party have, I dare say, censured your want of discretion; and, in this second article, we see you endeavouring to extricate yourself, at the expence of your understanding or your sincerity.

SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS.—When, upon a former occasion, I had to notice the conduct of this gentleman, as relating to the action for a libel, brought by Sir JOHN CARR, Knight, against Messrs. Hood and Sharpe, for publishing a criticism upon a work of Sir John's, I had not been informed of many circumstances, which have since come to my knowledge, and which do certainly exhibit Sir Richard in quite another light than that of a man, who would wish to see the principles of freedom cherished in England. It appears, from the report of the Trial, now published at full, and some parts of which report I shall more fully notice hereafter, that Sir Richard was, if not an adviser, at least an approver of the prosecution, a fact, which, had it not been proved in so clear a way, I could not have believed. What! one bookseller approve of the prosecution, or, rather the persecution of another, and that, too, for publishing a criticism upon a work of which he himself was become the proprietor! A near relation of his has, it seems, prosecuted the editors of a catch-penny work called "*THE SATIRIST*," for a criticism upon a child's book, which those editors represented as having an immoral tendency; and that *six-pence* damages were obtained. It is further asserted in print, that Sir Richard himself preferred a bill of indictment against the same Satirists

for something said by them of him, and that the bill was *thrown out*. The consequence of all this has been a pretty general feeling of resentment against him, in all those who have any thing to do with the press, and that feeling, so far from having been awed into silence by his endeavours for that purpose, has shewn itself in literary attacks from various quarters and of various descriptions, from a two-shilling-and-six-penny pamphlet down to a half-penny ballad. His attention is now drawn from the odious caricature of Sir John Carr to the many, wherein he himself cuts the principal figure. He cannot take up a newspaper without seeing some paragraph or advertisement inviting the reader to a laugh at his expence. The very walls in the streets he sees covered with notifications as to where and when the public may be entertained in the same agreeable way. One author has employed his pen in writing a burlesque account of him, entitled, "*Memoirs of the public and private Life of Sir Richard Phillips, Knight: By a Citizen of London and Assistants*." His old friends the Satirists, who, probably, wrote the book for the purpose, have taken it up as a subject to review; have chosen to consider it as a *serious* statement; and have thus made it a two-edged instrument for the purpose of goading him and his family, no part of whom, whether wife or child, do they spare, though it is not at all improbable, that some of them may have often satisfied their hunger at his table. They go so far as to say, that he has been "*in the habit of attaching an alias*" to his name, and that he "*once went by the name of Philip Richards*." The pretended biographer, after relating, that Sir Richard, when he lived at Leicester in the capacity of a hosier, had his premises destroyed by fire, adds, that he "*had insured his property not many months before*, and that, when every one supposed him ruined, he rose like a phoenix from his ashes." Upon this the Satirists say, by way of note, that in 1795, Sir Richard received £1.500 from the Phoenix fire-office; and they then proceed to complain of the biographer for being silent upon "*the supposed cause of the conflagration*;" after which they add: "*perhaps our biographer never heard, that his hero, soon after the accident, wrote to a friend, stating to this effect: 'that, although it was very true the fire office had amply remunerated him for his losses, yet, that it was such a glorious opportunity for taking advantage of the public feelings, who did not know his premises had been*

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"insured, that he intreated him instantly
"to promote a subscription in his favour;"
and yet we have been told, that such a letter
"was written, and is not yet destroyed."

As to what these writers say about Lady Phillips, of whom they would evidently have said harm if they could; about Sir Richard's vanity, and other foibles; about his squabbles with authors: these are not worth notice; but, the charges above made, with respect to the *name* and the *fire*, as I dare say they can, so perhaps they may, receive a serious contradiction from, and in the name of, the person against whom they are brought. But, above all things, I would advise Sir Richard not again to resort to the law. He has quite enough of means in his own hands wherewith to expose any *falsehoods* that have been, or may be published against him; and, he may rest assured, that, whatever anger he may feel against the promulgators of those falsehoods, the most effectual way of inflicting punishment on them, is, except in very particular cases, to leave them to that avenging hunger and thirst, to satisfy the cravings of which they have recourse (for the want of talents whereby to attract attention) to any means, however base, of obtaining notoriety. When one contemplates the mean trick to which these men have resorted, in writing a book for the purpose of having it to review, and making the book and the review a puff for each other; and especially when one sees them unnecessarily introducing the wife of the person whom they are assaulting, and who is, in no way whatever, concerned in the transactions of which they complain; when one sees them resort to means of annoyance so very low, it may well be a question with Sir Richard whether he ought to condescend to contradict any of their assertions; for, it must be evident to every man of sense, into whose hands their work may chance to fall, that there is no falsehood at which they will stick. These men have no principle. They hate not any vanity that Sir Richard may have. They hate him because he has a dinner and shoes, they having neither. They are said to be six or eight authors, whom he has been obliged to discharge for stupidity, a statement strongly corroborated by the superabundance of malice and the plentiful lack of talent, visible in the pretended biographer and in the reviewers of his performance. What, in the name of common sense, had Sir Richard to do with prosecutions of literary vermin like these, who write by the foot, who come to the pay-table of a Saturday night, like weavers or tinkers; whose

master must long ago have discharged them had not Sir Richard indiscreetly furnished their collection of trash with an interesting topic; and to whom, in all human probability, he would, ere his Shrievalty had been at an end, have had to dole out their daily allowance of water and bread. The generality of readers have not the most distant idea what miserable creatures those are, who are employed to work upon publications of this sort. Their names are cautiously disguised, and that for more reasons than one. Their retreats are more secret, and far more filthy, than those of the fox or the polecat. I would bet the worth of their work, that all the clothes upon all their backs would not sell for fifty shillings. This is precisely that sort of writers, whom Peter Pindar describes as being to be bribed with "buckets of broth and pounds of bullock's liver." And yet, by creatures like these has Sir Richard Phillips been goaded even to the point of *appealing to the law*! This is what I dislike. Had he resorted to the horse-whip, the pump, or the horse-pond, why, I should have said, that it was foolish, to be sure, but that men cannot always command their passion. But, to appeal to the law; to do that which might keep in countenance the fools and rogues, who, when properly spoken of, charge the speaker with a *crime*; to join the band who walk without being spit upon, merely because truth is a libel; to attack that press which he, as well as any man, knows to be at its last gasp; to avail himself of his elevation to mount his brethren with lawyers' spurs. This is what I cannot forgive, and it is what he will repent of to the end of his life.—The Trial, in the case of Carr against Messrs. Hood and Sharpe, is one of the most important, nay the most important, that has taken place in my memory, and I am glad to see that it is fully and ably reported. According to the doctrine here laid down, both by the Chief Justice and the Attorney General, one man may, not only innocently, but *laudably*, ridicule the person and the talents of another. Not only freely examine them and criticise them, but ridicule them. The whole of the Trial is important. I do not mean as an exposure of Carr and Sir Richard Phillips, but as containing the principles of the Judges and the Attorney General respecting libels; and it will be matter of wonder with me, if the Booksellers do not form a FUND for the circulation of it *all over the kingdom*. An edition might be printed for *three-pence* each; each bookseller might take a number proportioned to the extent of his business; some copies, or one at least, might be put

into every parcel sent off from every shop; and thus, in the course of a year, every man who can read would have read it. This is no loose essay upon the libel-law. It is the practice of the law. It is what the Attorney General and the Chief Justice have said and what they have laid down as law. Towards a fund for this purpose I shall be very happy to contribute my share; for I am certain that there has not, for years, any publication appeared calculated to do so much good. —To fall upon a man already down, or to join in a general outcry, is not my practice; nor have I any desire, in what I recommend, to annoy Sir Richard Phillips. I think it of great public consequence, that this Trial should be universally read. As I observed before, the action, out of which this trial grew, was founded upon the new principle, namely, that *WHATEVER HURTS A MAN'S FEELINGS is to be considered as libellous*. The trial has completely set this principle aside; and, in fact, we are much obliged to Sir John Carr for having put the principle to the test. Until Sir John did this, there was no man who could tell whether he dared criticise the works of any author. Indeed, according to the principle laid down, and acted upon, he did not dare do it, without running a risk of punishment. Good God! What would have been said by POPE and SWIFT, if any one had said to them: "It is well for you, that you live in this age; for, in that which will succeed, to ridicule a fool or a knave, will subject men to all the tortments of the law; and, there is scarcely one single sentence, that either of you have written, especially where you touch upon the character or conduct of public men, that would not, to a certainty, shorten your lives, and, perhaps, your ears, before you died." What would Gay have said, had he been told, that his Fables, in the next age, would have subjected him to ear-cropping? Yet, the nation was as well-governed then, as it is now, and, as to matters of literature, it was far greater than it now is. Were a man to write now as Pope and Swift wrote, he would have the full cry of Bond Street and St. James's against him. He would be called ruffian and assassin. He would be accused of coarseness, grossness, personality. He would be called an enemy to politeness, taste, refinement, and human happiness. I have often wondered, that some of the descendants of the rogues and fools whom they lashed, have not prosecuted the printers and the sellers of their admirable satires, which, were they written in the

present day, would be deemed infamous libels. They had no idea that to write and publish *truth* was a crime. The whole tenor of their works proves, that, so long as they confined themselves to the stating of what was *true*, they entertained no apprehensions as to the consequences. Upon the topics connected with *royalty*, too, they were no more squeamish than upon others. They were afraid of no *constructive* libels; nor, if they chose to express their disapprobation of the conduct of kings and princes, did they fear the accusation of *disloyalty*. Why, if either of them, had written, in the present day, what both wrote at the beginning of the last century, he would long ago have been transported, under that act of parliament, for which we have to thank, principally, Pitt and Lord Grenville. Yet, as I observed before, the times they lived and wrote in were very glorious times for England; such times as England has not since seen; times in which she shone more, both in arms and in letters, than she ever did before, and than she is likely to do again. —The rogues and fools in public life have powerful motives for cramping the press, and all the rogues and fools in private life are naturally of their party. It must be so. Vice and folly, of whatever description, hate the light. Publicity is their natural enemy. Public prosecutions lead to private prosecutions; and why not? If a man is to be punished for exposing the vices or follies of a person whom the public employs, why should not the exposé of a private person be punished? It is detestable to tell us, that regular government cannot be supported without this sort of prosecutions. To tell us, that a government cannot subsist without laws to punish the publication of *truth*, is, in fact, to tell us, that that government subsists by falsehood and fraud. —Besides, if a government cannot subsist without such prosecutions, it never can *long* subsist with them, unless it becomes a complete despotism, which is a state of constant warfare between the government and the people, and which, as we have recently seen in many instances, will subsist no longer than the people are without an opportunity of casting off its authority. If the government subsist with the wishes of the people, what need has it of prosecutions for any animadversions upon its conduct? And, of what *use* are the prosecutions? Suppose, for instance, some one accuse the government of tyrannical conduct. If his assertion be unsupported by proof, none but the very ignorant part of the nation will believe him; and, even on

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401] their minds, he will produce no lasting impression. If he speak *truth*, it is not only proper that he should speak freely and without danger; but, the prosecution of him, in that case, and by a form of process which does not admit of his pleading the truth in his defence, must have, as to the government, an effect ten thousand times worse than if he had not been prosecuted; such a prosecution proving, not that the government was innocent of the charge, but, tending to prove that it was guilty, and that the person prosecuted has been the victim of vindictive guilt. And, in cases, where his assertions are void of proof; assertions which hardly any one will believe; such assertions gain credit from the mere circumstance of their author becoming an object of prosecution. Nothing can, by what is called a criminal prosecution, be obtained *favourable* to the reputation of the prosecuting party. His innocence cannot be proved. The form of proceeding, according to the present practice, does not admit of it. What does he get, then? A glutting of his vengeance, a gratification of his vindictive feelings, and the hope of being able to prevent future detection and exposure. But, those who, perhaps, only despised him before, will now hate him; and this hatred, justly sticking to him through life, will amply supply the place of future exposures. His escaping censure will ever after be attributed to the dread of punishment in those who are able and willing to censure him. Thus, he will always be regarded as guilty, even to a degree, perhaps, beyond the truth; and every just man will see, with pleasure, the hour of his misfortune and destruction.—It is now rather more than a year ago, since a gentleman, who had been most shamefully misrepresented and belied in the newspapers, and who had, indeed, been distinctly accused of very heinous offences, wrote to me an explanation of the circumstances of the case, and intimated, in conclusion, his intention of appealing to the law. I participated in his indignation against the publishers; but, conjured him not to appeal to the law; because, now, or in a short time, the whole nation would be convinced of the falsehood of what had been said against him, whereas, if he prosecuted, the whole nation would have doubts, at least, upon the subject. He followed my advice. He suffered the web of falsehood to be spun out, and he has found, that not a human creature in England believes one of them. It is in reason that it should be thus. Truth, give it fair play, will always triumph over falsehood. Pit them against one another, giving them

both the free scope of the press, and there is no fear but the former will prevail. Every man does, every man must, know this; and, as every man is quite at liberty to answer those who attack him in print, and as every man has the ability to state plain facts in his defence, his appealing to the law always is, and always must be, a circumstance conveying suspicion, that *he wants truth* wherewith to repel the attack.—As to *ridicule*, good lord, what would DRYDEN, POPE, and SWIFT have said, had they been told, that, in their country, it would become a crime to wound men's feelings by holding them up to ridicule! Ridicule is a thing that *will not attach where it ought not*. I defy Mr. Gillray to turn Lord Nelson's skill and courage into ridicule. You may attempt to ridicule any thing. This master of the art has tried his talents upon Sir Francis Burdett and his Westminster procession; but, if he would make a candid confession, he would tell us, that that was amongst the most unsuccessful of his efforts; he would tell us, that not a soul, except, perhaps, Mr. Baldwin, to whose name the folks at Whitehall prefix the infantine appellation of *Billy*, ever thought this piece worth carrying home. There must be the ingredients of ridicule in the thing ridiculed, without which, to attempt to ridicule it, is like attempting to strike fire out of clay. Well, then, ridicule is, in all cases, not only innocent, but laudable; because, that which is ridiculous ought to be ridiculed. What must the world think of the man, or set of men, who can come into a court of justice and demand reparation, or vengeance, for having been *laughed at*? Who, like CALIBAN, can come and say: "Mark how he mocks me; "I pray thee, my lord, bite him to death?" It is, and always has been, I suppose, the fashion of babies to run to their parents with complaints of being laughed at; but, for grown up men to do this; for knights and other great folks to fall into the practice; for courts of law and justice to be made the instruments of their childish resentment: this, were it not but too true, would be ridiculous indeed. What is that reputation? What can that reputation be worth? Whose care, or protection, can it merit, if it be not sufficient to stand the test of ridicule?—An indictment! An indictment preferred against a book-maker or a bookseller; an indictment against the press by one who had so long thriven by the press, and who now had so much of that press at his command, together with abundance of talents to make use of it! Of a *fool's* wrath the world has long been taught to beware; but, who

would have expected a prosecution of this sort at the hands of Sir Richard Phillips! Vanity, pure vanity, has been the undoing of this gentleman. It has filled him with a feverish anxiety about what the world says of him. Curse on the gold chain and the glass coach and the gaudy liveries. Is it possible that they could turn the head of a man of sense! One would have thought that he had had opportunities enough of witnessing the ridicule attending the annual nobility of the city. Lords for a year, and then lords no more. Well, he was duly warned of the consequences. The last day I had the pleasure of seeing him, which was in February, I parted with him, in Fleet-street, with these words: "God bless you, Phillips, and "preserve you from the honours of knight-hood." When I read the paragraph, giving an account of his hand-kissing scene, I was sick. I foresaw, as I thought, all the fooleries that were to follow; but, I really did not anticipate a prosecution of those, whose low and malignant envy, *such* honours were so well calculated to set in motion; much less did I ever expect to see, in Mr. Phillips, a spirit of persecution against his brother booksellers and against the press in general.—There is only one way of recovering the blows, which he has invited, and which are now falling upon him as thick as those of the muleteers upon the knight of the woeful countenance; and that is, holding both his tongue and his pen, until his justly offended adversaries are wearied with the exercise of belabouring him; for, the more he struggles the faster and harder will they strike, nor can he reasonably expect them to cease, while they perceive, in him, the least appearance of the remains of life. Pursuing the course that I have pointed out, he may, by degrees, be able to creep forth again; but, if his indiscretion shall give to the warfare any considerable duration, the consequences of it will stick to him to the end of his days:

"Sacred to ridicule his whole life long,

"And the sad burden of some merry song."

There is not a poet of any size, but will try his hand upon him. His name, with ridicule attached to it, will find its way into all sorts of publications; and, long after he himself will have returned to his native earth, his story will live as a warning to all those, who shall be suspected of a disposition to screen their vanity from ridicule by a prosecution in a court of law.

Botley, Sept. 8, 1808.

POOR.—MITCHAM.

(Concluded from page 384.)

It may be alledged that the paupers

are now farmed at 4s. 6d. per head; that is certainly true; but it is in the parish house, by a man under the control of the officers, who visit the house constantly; and the best refutation against any charge on this head is, that formerly incessant complaints were made by paupers for ill-usage, and mismanagement, and since the present establishment, not a single murmur has been heard by the magistrates; all are satisfied, except those who assumed the title of lady patronesses to the snivelling children of the workhouse, that were formerly taught nothing but to hymn out a sort of blasphemous and fulsome flattery to them, at the parish expense; but are now sent into the world apprenticed to respectable tradesmen and put in the way of obtaining an honest livelihood. The reduction from 14s. the extreme of the rate formerly, to 5s. 6d. the extreme of it ever since, is in itself a benefit of such consideration as entitles Mr. Moore to public thanks; but the leading youth to habits of industry, compelling the idle and profligate to labour, instead of canting for their support, is a work of such superior merit, as entitles him to the thanks of every good man, who loves his country; and if his example be generally imitated, I should hope and expect to see the time *again*, when the poison of soup-shop charity and the quackery of affrighted benevolence, shall cease to debase the sentiments and expectations of the poor; and every cottager in the lowest situation, shall with true English independence exult, "I have brought up my children to honest labour, and, thank God! "without being indebted to the parish."—I am, Sir, yours, &c.—JOHN.—*Aug. 8, 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—From the *London Gazette Extraordinary*. (Continued from p. 352.)

But if the principles of this plan should be approved of, and deemed feasible by those in command, I would recommend the movement to be general. That it be agreed to act upon it in all its parts the same day, except a discovery should take place, in which case each part should act immediately without hesitation.—I acknowledge I should have little expectation of the success of any negotiation for the peaceable removal of the troops. But a declaration immediately after the movement shall have commenced, of the peaceable and unoffending object in view, accompanied with a threat of retaliation in the event of any hostile opposition on the part of the Danes or French, might perhaps

be found force a right more sufficient have KEATS la Romish tr N B supply obviate Brun have h of you and to tion on taken o stances arrival sight. wick, i uses ca in Nyb receive and, u me the with al it appea camp. maintain till the army, ty of th more as baggage in them tion. A seamen the prop of a m scale po to keep ter and sent circ I have R. G. I quis de the Spa Brun Sir,—H of the S deemed circum my duty with the quent f town of cy as m line of

be found advantageous.—In stating the naval force at present under my command, it is right to observe, I am, in expectation of more ships, and have been informed that a sufficient supply of provisions for all the Spanish troops is now on its passage to me.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) R. G. KEATS.—To his excellency the marquis de la Romana, commander in-chief of the Spanish troops in Denmark.

N.B. I have just heard that the expected supply of provisions is in part arrived, which obviates difficulties on my part.

Brunswick, August 9, 1808.—Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of this morning, and to congratulate you and the Spanish nation on the firm and manly step you have taken on this important occasion. Circumstances of weather unavoidably prevent the arrival of two ships of the line, now in sight. I send captain Graves, of the Brunswick, informed of my ideas, to see what uses can be made of the vessels at present in Nyborg. In my present situation I can receive nearly fifteen hundred men on board: and, under all circumstances, it appears to me the most advisable to convey the troops with all expedition to Langeland; and, as it appears to be the opinion of your aide-de-camp, that you will be in a situation to maintain that island, and to take post there till the arrival of transports to embark the army, I shall order seamen in to man twenty of the smacks at present in the port, and more as the ships arrive. I apprehend the baggage and artillery had better be embarked in them, and moved out under my protection. Among the Spanish troops perhaps seamen may be found; and I would suggest the propriety of the immediate establishment of a marine corps on the most extensive scale possible; and I request your excellency to keep in mind that the embarkation of water and provisions with the troops, in our present circumstances, is of great consequence. I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed) R. G. KEATS.—To his excellency the marquis de la Romana, commander-in-chief of the Spanish troops in Denmark.

Brunswick, off Nyborg, August 9, 1808. Sir,—His excellency the commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces in Denmark, having deemed it expedient, under the present circumstances, to take possession of Nyborg, my duty naturally calls me to a co-operation with the troops of that nation, and a consequent frequent communication with the town of Nyborg. To place your excellency as much at ease as possible respecting the line of conduct that may be adopted in the

present event by the English admiral commanding in the Belt, notwithstanding the hostility of this day, I have the honour to inform you, that I have given the strictest orders to all under my command, to observe towards the inhabitants of Nyborg the utmost civility; and it is my wish to abstain from every hostile and offensive act, so long as no hostile and offensive measures are pursued by the troops of Denmark or France against those of Spain; but if any opposition should be attempted either by the Danes or French to the peaceable and unoffending object in view, namely, the quiet embarkation of the Spanish troops, I shall certainly, though most reluctantly, take measures which it is to be apprehended might occasion the destruction of the town of Nyborg. I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed) R. G. KEATS.—To his excellency the governor of the town of Nyborg.

Hound, Nyborg Harbour, August 10, 1808.—Sir,—It must be evident to your excellency, that as my entrance into the harbour of Nyborg was hostilely opposed, I am bound by no absolute law or usage to abstain from hostilities, and to respect the property of the inhabitants: but although neither one nor the other could be better secured than by the word of a British officer, still it must be evident to your excellency, that under existing circumstances the Spanish general has occasion for several of the small craft in port, and that unless the masters and crews of them will lend their aid to equip and navigate their vessels, it may not be in my power to secure them from injury; but if they will, I pledge myself, after the service on which they are required, and which will be of short duration, shall have been ended, that I will not only use every means in my power to secure them from injury, but grant passports to them all to return in safety. I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed) R. G. KEATS.—To his excellency the governor of the town of Nyborg.

Superb, off Langeland, August 13, 1808.—Sir,—I have detained the Euryalus a few hours, for the further satisfaction of assuring their lordships, that the whole of the Spanish troops taken off by his majesty's ships at Nyborg, will be landed in the course of this afternoon at Langeland.—A convention has been entered into between his excellency the marquis de la Romana and the governor of the island, which, on one hand, enjoins abstinence from hostility, and, on the other, a sufficient supply of provisions, provided the island, which is fertile, can produce it. I am, Sir, &c.—(Signed) R. G. KEATS.—The right hon. W. W. Pole, &c.

VICTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL. *From the London Gazette Extraordinary.*

Downing-Street, Sept. 2, 1808.—Dispatches, of which the following are copies and extracts, were last night received from lieutenant-general sir Harry Burrard, and lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, dated from head-quarters, at Lourinha, addressed to viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, and brought by captain Campbell, aid-de-camp to sir A. Wellesley: *Extract of a Letter from Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, dated Head-Quarters, at Caldas, the 10th of Aug. 1808.*

I marched from Lyria on the 13th, and arrived at Aliobaça on the 19th, which place the enemy had abandoned in the preceding night; and I arrived here yesterday. The enemy, about 4000 in number, were posted about 10 miles from hence, at Borica; and they occupied Brilos, about 3 miles from hence, with their advanced posts. As the possession of this last village was important to our future operations, I determined to occupy it; and as soon as the British infantry arrived upon the ground, I directed that it might be occupied by a detachment, consisting of 4 companies of riflemen of the 60 and 95th regiments. The enemy, consisting of a small piquet of infantry and a few cavalry, made a trifling resistance and retired; but they were followed by a detachment of our riflemen to the distance of 3 miles from Brilos. The riflemen were then attacked by a superior body of the enemy, who attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detachment to which they belonged, which had now advanced to their support; larger bodies of the enemy appeared on both the flanks of the detachment, and it was with difficulty that major-general Spencer, who had gone out to Cebidos when he had heard that the riflemen had advanced in pursuit of the enemy, was enabled to effect their retreat to that village. They have since remained in possession of it, and the enemy have retired entirely from the neighbourhood.—In this little affair of the advanced posts, which was occasioned solely by the eagerness of the troops in pursuit of the enemy, I am concerned to add, that lieutenant Bunbury, of the 2d battalion of the 95th, was killed, and the hon. Captain Pakenham wounded, but slightly; and we have lost some men, of whose number I have not received the returns.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Action at Lourinha. Aug. 15, 1808.—5th batt. 60th foot, 1 rank and file killed;

5 rank and file wounded; 17 rank and file missing.—2d batt. 95th foot, 4 rank and file missing.—Officers killed and wounded, 95th foot, lieutenant Bunbury killed; captain the hon. H. K. Pakenham wounded.—G. B. TUCKER, Dep. Adj. Gen.

Head-quarters, at Villa Verde, Aug. 17, 1808.—My Lord, The French general Laborde having continued in his position at Roleia since my arrival at Caldas on the 15th inst. I determined to attack him in the morning. Roleia is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its front, at the end of a valley, which commences at Caldas, and is closed to the southward by mountains, which join the hills, forming the valley on the left, looking from Caldas. In the centre of the valley, and about 8 miles from Roleia, is the town and old Moorish fort of Cebidos, from whence the enemy's piquets had been driven on the 15th; and from that time he had posts on the hills on both sides of the valley, as well as in the plain in front of his army, which was posted on the heights in front of Roleia, its right resting upon the hills, its left upon an eminence, on which was a windmill, and the whole covering four or five passes into the mountains in his rear.—I have reason to believe that his force consisted of at least 6000 men, of which about 500 were cavalry, with 5 pieces of cannon; and there was some reason to believe that Gen. Loison, who was at Rio Major yesterday, would join Gen. Laborde by his right in the course of the night. The plan of attack was formed accordingly, and the army having broken up from Caldas this morning, was formed into three columns; the right, consisting of 1200 Portuguese infantry and 50 Portuguese cavalry, destined to turn the enemy's left, and penetrate into the mountains in his rear; the left, consisting of major-general Ferguson's and brigadier-general Bowes's brigades of infantry, three companies of riflemen, a brigade of light artillery, and 20 British, and 20 Portuguese cavalry, was destined, under the command of major-general Ferguson, to ascend the hills at Cebidos, to turn all the enemy's posts on the left of the valley, as well as the right of his post at Roleia; this corps was also destined to watch the motions of Gen. Loison, on the enemy's right, who, I had heard, had moved from Rio Major towards Alcoentre last night. The centre column, consisting of major-general Hill's, brigadier-general Nightingale's, brigadier-general Craufurd's, and brigadier-general Fane's brigades, (with the exception of the riflemen detached with major-general Ferguson), and 400 Portuguese light infantry, the British and Portu-

409] guese cavalry, a brigade of nine-pounders, and a brigade of six-pounders, were destined to attack gen. Laborde's position in front.—The columns being formed, the troops moved from Oebidos about 7 in the morning. Brig. gen. Fane's riflemen were immediately detached into the hills on the left of the valley, to keep up the communication between the centre and left columns, and to protect the march of the former along the valley; and the enemy's posts were successively driven in. Maj. gen. Hill's brigade, formed in three columns of battalions, moved on the right of the valley, supported by the cavalry, in order to attack the enemy's left; and brig. generals Nightingale and Craufurd moved with the artillery along the high road, until at length the former formed in the plain immediately in the enemy's front, supported by the light infantry companies, and the 45th regiment of brig. gen. Craufurd's brigade, while the two other regiments of this brigade (the 50th and 91st), and half of the 9-pounder brigade, were kept as a reserve in the rear.—Maj. gen. Hill and brig. gen. Nightingale advanced upon the enemy's position, and, at the same moment, brig. gen. Fane's riflemen were in the hills on his right; the Portuguese infantry in a village upon his left; and maj. gen. Ferguson's column was descending from the heights into the plain. From this situation the enemy retired by the passes into the mountains with the utmost regularity and the greatest celerity; and notwithstanding the rapid advance of the British infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry was the cause of his suffering but little loss in the plain.—It was then necessary to make a disposition to attack the formidable position which he had taken up. Brigadier-general Fane's riflemen were already in the mountains on his right, and no time was lost in attacking the different passes, as well to support the riflemen as to defeat the enemy completely.—The Portuguese infantry were ordered to move up a pass on the right of the whole; the light companies of maj. gen. Hill's brigade and the 5th regiment moved up a pass next on the right; and the 29th regiment, supported by the 9th under brig. gen. Nightingale, a third pass; and the 45th and 82d regiments, passes on the left. These passes were all difficult of access, and some of them were well defended by the enemy, particularly that which was attacked by the 29th and 9th. These regiments attacked with the greatest impetuosity, and reached the enemy before those whose attacks were to be made on their flanks: the defence of the enemy was des-

perate, and it was in this attack principally that we sustained the loss which we have to lament, particularly of that gallant officer, the hon. lieut. col. Lake, who distinguished himself upon this occasion.—The enemy, was, however, driven from all the positions he had taken in the passes of the mountains, and our troops were advanced in the plains on their tops. For a considerable length of time the 29th and 9th regiments alone were advanced to this point, with brig. gen. Fane's riflemen at a distance on the left, and they were afterwards supported by the 5th regiment, and by the light companies of maj. gen. Hill's brigade, which had come up on their right; and by the other troops ordered to ascend the mountains, who came up by degrees. The enemy here made three most gallant attacks upon the 29th and 9th regiments, supposed, as I have above stated, with a view to cover the retreat of his defeated army; in all of which he was, however, repulsed; but he succeeded in effecting his retreat in good order, owing, principally, to my want of cavalry, and secondly, to the difficulty of bringing up the passes of the mountains with celerity, a sufficient number of troops, and of cannon, to support those which had first ascended. The loss of the enemy has, however, been very great; and he left three pieces of cannon in our hands.—I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of the troops throughout this action. The enemy's positions were formidable, and he took them up with his usual ability and celerity, and defended them most gallantly. But I must observe, that although we had such a superiority of numbers employed in the operations of this day, the troops actually engaged in the heat of the action were, from unavoidable circumstances, only the 5th, 9th, 29th, the riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of maj. gen. Hill's brigade, being a number by no means equal to that of the enemy; their conduct, therefore, deserves the highest commendation.—I cannot avoid to take this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgements for the aid and support I received from all the general and other officers of this army. I am particularly indebted to maj. gen. Spencer for the advice and assistance I received from him: to maj. gen. Ferguson for the manner in which he led the left column, and to maj. gen. Hill, and brig. generals Nightingale and Fane for the manner in which they conducted the different attacks which they led. I derived most material assistance also from lieut. col. Tucker and lieut. col. Bathurst, in the offices of deputy-adjutant and deputy-quarter-mas-

ter general, and from the officers of the staff employed under them. I must also mention that I had every reason to be satisfied with the artillery, under lieut. col. Robe. I have the honour to be, &c.—
(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of Lieut. Gen. the Right Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K. B. on the 17th of Aug. 1808.—Head Quarters, Lourinha, Aug. 18, 1808.

Gen. Staff, 1 capt. killed.—Royal Artillery, 1 capt. killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—Royal Engineers, 1 capt. wounded.

1st Brigade, Maj. Gen. Hill.—5th Foot, 3 rank and file killed; 1 major, 1 lieut. 2 serjeants, 39 rank and file wounded.—9th Foot, rank and file killed; 1 lieut. col. 1 maj. 1 capt. 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 49 rank and file wounded; 12 rank and file missing.—38th Foot, 4 rank and file wounded.

2d Brigade, Maj. Gen. Ferguson.—26th Foot, none killed or wounded.—40th Foot, 1 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.—71st Foot, 1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

3d Brigade Brig. Gen. Nightingale.—29th Foot, 1 lieut. col. 2 serjeants, 31 rank and file killed; 1 maj. 3 capt. 3 lieuts, 6 serjeants, 105 rank and file wounded; 1 capt. 3 lieuts 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 32 rank and file missing.—82d Foot, 6 rank and file killed; 1 lieut. 1 serjeant, 17 rank and file wounded.

4th Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Bowes.—6th Foot, 1 captain, 2 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—32d Foot 1 rank and file killed; 3 rank and file wounded.

5th Brigade, Brig. Gen. Craufurd.—45th Foot, 1 ensign killed; 1 lieut. 9 rank and file wounded.—50th Foot, 2 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—91st Foot, none killed or wounded.

6th, or Light, Brig.-Gen. Fane.—2 Battalion, 59th foot, 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file killed; 3 serjeants, 25 rank and file wounded; 7 rank and file missing.—5th Battalion, 60th Foot, 8 rank file killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 staff, 5 serjeants, 34 rank and file wounded; 16 rank and file missing.

Cavalry.—20th Light Dragoons, 1 horse killed; 3 rank and file, 2 horses wounded.—Total, 1 lieut. col., 2 captains, 1 ensign 3 serjeants, 63 rank and file, 1 horse killed; 1 lieut. col., 3 majors, 6 captains, 8 lieut. 1 ensign, 1 staff, 20 serjeants, 295 rank and file, 2 horses wounded; 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 68 rank and file missing.

Names of Officers killed, wounded, and missing, on the 17th of August, 1808.—

General Staff, Capt. K. J. Bradford, 3d regiment foot guards deputy assistant adjutant general killed.—Royal Artillery, captain H. Geary killed.—Royal Engineers, Capt. H. Elphinstone badly wounded.—5th Foot, Major Emes slightly wounded, Lieut. Doyle wounded.—9th Foot, Lieut.-Col. Stuart severely wounded; Major Molle wounded; Capt. Sankay wounded; Ensign Nichols wounded.—29th Foot, lieut. col. the hon. G. A. F. Lake killed; Majors G. Way and Thomas Egerson wounded; captains P. Hodge and A. Patison wounded; lieutenants R. Birmingham, St. John W. Lucas, and R. Stannus wounded; Capt. G. Tod missing; lieutenants W. Birmingham, A. Newbold, and T. Langton missing.—6th Foot, Capt. John Curry, slightly wounded.—45th Foot, Ensign Dawson killed; Lieut. Burke slightly wounded.—82d Foot, Lieut. R. Reid dangerously wounded.—60th Foot, Lieut. Kiety slightly wounded; Ensign Dawes slightly wounded; Adj. De Gilso slightly wounded.—95th Foot, Capt. Creagh slightly wounded; lieutenants Hill and Cortman slightly wounded.

Abstract of the above Return.—4 officers killed; 20 officers wounded; 4 officers missing; 3 non-commissioned officers and drummers killed; 20 non-commissioned officers and drummers wounded; 2 non-commissioned officers and drummers missing; 63 rank and file killed; 295 rank and file wounded; 68 rank and file missing; 1 horse killed; 2 horses wounded.—Total, officers, non-commissioned officers, rank and file, and horses killed, wounded, and missing, 482.—G. B. TUCKER, Dep. Adj. Gen.

*Head-quarters at Lourinha, August 18, 1808.—MY LORD;—*Since I wrote to you last night, I have heard from brig. gen. Anstruther, that he is on the coast of Piniche, with the fleet of victuallers and store ships, in charge of Capt. Bligh, of the Alfred, with a part of the force detached from England under brig. gen. Ackland, in consequence of the receipt of orders which I had left at Mondego Bay for gen. Ackland, which he had opened. I have ordered brig. gen. Anstruther to land immediately, and I have moved to this place, in order to protect his landing, and facilitate his junction.—Gen. Loison joined gen. Laborde in the course of last night at Torres Vedras; and I understand that both began their march towards Lisbon this morning. I also hear that gen. Junot has arrived this day at Torres Vedras, with a small corps from Lisbon; and I conclude that the whole

of the French army will be assembled between Torres Vedras and the capital, in the course of a few days. I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Head-quarters, Maceira, Aug. 21, 1808.
MY LORD;—The report which I have the honour to inclose to your lordship, made at my request by lieut. gen. sir A. Wellesley, conveys information which cannot but prove highly gratifying to his majesty.—On my landing, this morning, I found that the enemy's attack had already commenced, and I was fortunate enough to reach the field of action in time to witness and approve of every disposition that had been, and was afterwards made by sir A. Wellesley; his comprehensive mind furnishing a ready resource in every emergency, and rendering it quite unnecessary to direct any alteration.—I am happy, on this occasion, to bear testimony to the great spirit and good conduct displayed by all the troops composing this gallant army in this well-contested action.—I send this dispatch by capt. Campbell, aid-de-camp to sir A. Wellesley, no person being better qualified to give your lordships information.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HARRY BURRARD, Lieut. General.—To the Rt. Hon. Lord Castlereagh, &c.

Vimiera, August 21, 1808.—Sir,—I have the honour to report to you, that the enemy attacked us in our position at Vimiera this morning.—The village of Vimiera stands in a valley, through which runs the river Maceira; at the back, and to the westward and northward of this village is a mountain, the western point of which touches the sea, and the eastern is separated by a deep ravine from the heights, over which passes the road which leads from Lourinha, and the northward, to Vimiera. The greater part of the infantry, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and 8th brigades, were posted on this mountain, with eight pieces of artillery, maj. gen. Hill's brigade being on the right, maj. gen. Ferguson's on the left, having one battalion on the heights, separated from the mountain. On the eastern and southern side of the town is a hill which is entirely commanded, particularly on its right, by the mountain to the westward of the town, and commanding all the ground in the neighbourhood to the southward and eastward, in which brig. gen. Fane was posted with his riflemen and the 50th regiment, and brig. gen. Anstruther with his brigade, with half a brigade of six-pounders and half a brigade of nine-pounders, which had been

ordered to the position in the course of last night. The ground over which passes the road from Lourinha commanded the left of this height, and it had not been occupied, excepting by a piquet, as the camp had been taken up only for one night; and there was no water in the neighbourhood of this height.—The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley between the hills on which the infantry stood: both flanking and supporting brig. gen. Fane's advanced guard.—The enemy first appeared at eight o'clock in the morning, in large bodies of cavalry on our left upon the heights on the road to Lourinha; and it was soon obvious that the attack would be made upon our advanced guard, and the left of our position; and maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade was immediately moved across the ravine to the heights, on the road to Lourinha, with three pieces of cannon; he was followed successively by brig. gen. Nightingale with his brigade and three pieces of cannon; brig. gen. Ackland with his brigade, and brig. gen. Bowes with his brigade. These troops were formed (maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade in the first line; brig. gen. Nightingale's in the second; and brig. gen. Bowe's and Ackland's, in columns in the rear) on those heights, with their right upon the valley which leads into Vimiera; and their left upon the other ravine, which separates these heights from the range which terminates at the landing-place at Maceira. On these last-mentioned heights, the Portuguese troops, which had been in the bottom near Vimiera, were posted in the first instance, and they were supported by brig. gen. Craufurd's brigade.—The troops of the advanced guard on the heights to the southward and eastward of the town were deemed sufficient for its defence, and maj. gen. Hill was moved to the centre of the mountain on which a great body of the infantry had been posted, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve to the whole army. In addition to this support these troops had that of the cavalry in the rear of their right.—The enemy's attack began in several columns on the whole of the troops on this height; on the left they advanced, notwithstanding the fire of the rifle-men, close to the 50th, and were checked and driven back only by the bayonets of that corps. The 2d battalion, 43d regiment, was likewise closely engaged with them in the road which leads into Vimiera; and part of that corps having been ordered into the church-yard to prevent them from penetrating into the town. On the right of the

Position they were repulsed by the bayonets of the 97th regiment, which corps was successfully supported by the 2d battalion 52d regiment, which, by an advance in column, took the enemy in flank.—Besides this opposition given to the attack of the enemy on our advanced guard by their own exertions, they were attacked in flank by brig. gen. Ackland's brigade in its advance to its position on the heights on the left, and a cannonade was kept up on the flank of the enemy's columns, by the artillery on those heights.—At length, after a most desperate contest, the enemy was driven back in confusion from this attack with the loss of seven pieces of cannon, many prisoners, and a great number of officers and soldiers killed and wounded. He was pursued by the detachment of the 20th light dragoons, but the enemy's cavalry were so much superior in numbers, that this detachment has suffered much, and lieut. col. Taylor was unfortunately killed.—Nearly at the same time the enemy's attack commenced upon the heights on the road to Lourinha. This attack was supported by a large body of cavalry, and was made with the usual impetuosity of the French troops. It was received with steadiness by maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st regiments; and these corps charged, as soon as the enemy approached them, who gave way, and they continued to advance upon him, supported by the 82d, one of the corps of brig. gen. Nightingale's brigade, which, as the ground extended, afterwards formed a part of the first line; by the 29th regiment, and by brig. gen. Bowe's and Ackland's brigades, while brig. gen. Craufurd's brigade, and the Portuguese troops, in two lines, advanced along the height on the left.—In the advance of maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade, six pieces of cannon were taken from the enemy, with many prisoners, and vast numbers were killed and wounded.—The enemy afterwards made an attempt to recover a part of his artillery, by attacking the 71st and 82d regiments, which were halted in a valley in which it had been taken. These regiments retired from the low grounds in the valley to the heights, where they halted, faced about, fired, and advanced upon the enemy, who had, by that time, arrived in the low ground, and they thus obliged him again to retire with great loss.—In this action, in which the whole of the French force in Portugal was employed under the command of the Duke D'Abrantes (General

Junot) in person, in which the enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery, and in which not more than half of the British army was actually engaged, he has sustained a signal defeat, and has lost 13 pieces of cannon, and 23 ammunition wagons, with powder, shells, stores of all descriptions, and twenty thousand rounds of musket ammunition. One general officer (Beniere) has been wounded and taken prisoner, and a great many officers and soldiers have been killed, wounded, and taken.—The valour and discipline of his majesty's troops have been conspicuous upon this occasion, as you, who witnessed the greatest part of the action, must have observed; but it is a justice to the following corps to draw your notice to them in a particular manner, viz.—the royal artillery, commanded by lieut. col. Robe; the 20th dragoons which had been commanded by lieut. col. Taylor; the 50th regiment, commanded by Col. Walker; the 2d battalion 95th foot, commanded by maj. Travers; the 5th battalion, 60th regiment, commanded by maj. Davy; the second battalion 43d, commanded by maj. Hull; the 2d battalion 52d, commanded by lieut. col. Ross; the 97th regiment, commanded by lieut. col. Lyon; the 36th regiment, commanded by col. Burne; the 40th, commanded by col. Kemmis; the 71st, commanded by lieut. col. Pack; and the 82d regiment, commanded by maj. Eyre.—In mentioning col. Burne, and the 36th regiment to you upon this occasion, I cannot avoid to add, that the regular and orderly conduct of this corps, throughout this service, and their gallantry and discipline in action have been conspicuous.—I must take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the general and staff officers of the army. I was much indebted to maj. gen. Spencer's judgement and experience, in the decision which I formed, with respect to the number of troops allotted to each point of defence; and for his advice and assistance throughout the action.—In the position taken up by maj. gen. Ferguson's brigade, and in its advance upon the enemy, that officer showed equal bravery and judgment; and much praise is due to brig. gen. Fane, and brig. gen. Anstruther, for their gallant defence of their position in front of Vimiera, and to brig. gen. Nightingale, for the manner in which he supported the attack upon the enemy, made by major-gen. Ferguson.—

(To be continued.)